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Murder -

Two Sentences Imposed

reversal of the Supreme Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases."7 A
lease from a state and a deed from a state which contains a reversionary
clause have been held to constitute involvement sufficient to be state
action. By extension, these holdings have justified finding proof of
state action in mere control of land use. Since zoning ordinances universally contain similar controls, this trend may well lead to a later decision that any licensing or supervision by a state renders all businesses
which serve the public subject to regulation under the fourteenth amendment.
Such decisions as rendered in the instant case indicate that the process
of judicial decision may finally settle the rights of our Negro minority
in the area of public accommodations - a task which the Congress so
far has found impossible.
EUGENE S. BAYER
CRIMINAL LAW -

FIRST DEGREE MURDER -

SEPARATE OFFENSES - TWO SENTENCES IMPOSED
State v. Ferguson, 175 Ohio St. 390, 195 N.E.2d 794 (1964).
In State v. Ferguson,' defendant was charged with two counts of firstdegree murder although only one person was killed. The first count encompassed the clause of Ohio Revised Code section 2901.01 dealing with
murder while attempting to commit a felony. The second count was a
charge of murder with premeditation and malice. Defendant changed
his plea to guilty after the impaneling of the jury and testimony by one
state's witness. The three-judge court trying him returned a verdict of
guilty on both counts, recommending mercy on the second. His life sentence on the latter conviction was to run concurrently with the death sentence on the first count.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the court erred in returning
"tw¢o verdicts of guilty of first-degree murder when only one general verdict could have been returned, and in imposing two sentences for the
commission of but one crime."2 In a five to two decision, the Ohio Su17. The dissent of' the first Justice Harlan seems to provide more basis for recent decisions
in this area than the majority decision from which he dissented. His prophetic words demanded that the fourteenth amendment be applied to public accommodations. "In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment... keepers
of inns and managers of places of public amusement are agents and instrumentalities of the
State, because they are charged with duties to the public and are amenable... to governmental
regulation." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 58-59 (1883). Justice Harlan's present-day
counterpart, Justice Douglas, concurs with current decisions containing extensions of the concept of state action, insisting at the same time that "there is no constitutional way ... in
which a State can license and supervise a business serving the public and endow it with the
authority to manage that business on the basis of apartheid .... "' Burton v. Wilmiigton
Parking Authority, 373 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1963) (concurring opinion). Cf. Simpkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
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preme Court affirmed the two convictions, holding that each count
charged a separate and distinct offense of first-degree murder. The basis
of the ruling was that separate facts existed which would support a conviction on each count. Concerning the penalties, the court said:
where two valid sentences have been imposed for a single murder,
one of death and one of life imprisonment, that sentence which calls
for the highest and most severe punishment - death - 3 will be im-

posed, with the life sentence, in effect, being surplusage.
Section 2941.04 of the Ohio Revised Code permits an indictment
joining under separate counts "two or more different offenses connected
together in their commission, or different statements of the same offense,
or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes." This
joinder provision helps the prosecution meet problems of proof. Election
between the different offenses or counts is not required.4 It is error, however, to give two sentences for the same offense although it is stated in
two different ways in a two-count indictment.5 The problem for the
courts is in determining what is meant by "same offense."
Identity of offenses is basically a double jeopardy problem. Assuming section 2901.01 contains one offense, then defendant was in jeopardy
the moment the three-judge court began to consider the two counts as
separate offenses. Not being able to foresee that the court would split
the offense (a fatal error at common law), defendant had no opportunity
to raise an objection of former jeopardy. Had each count been the basis
of a separate indictment or trial, the error would become more apparent.
Ohio has developed a test for what constitutes the "same offense."
In State v.Rose,' it was said that "if the defendant upon the first charge
could have been convicted of the offense in the second, then he has been
in jeopardy." 7 This is the traditional statement of the "same evidence"
test. In the same opinion, however, the Ohio court gave the following
definition: The words "same offense" mean same offense, not the same
transaction, not the same acts, not the same circumstances or same situation.8 With this statement the court may have restricted the interpretation of the "same evidence" test in Ohio.
1. 175 Ohio St. 390, 195 N.E.2d 794 (1964).
2. Id. at 391, 195 N.E.2d at 795.
3. Id.at 396, 195 N.E.2d at 798. Semantic difficulties hint at the legal problems. Are
there now two "murders" when one man is killed or just a "single murder" with two offenses
of murder?
4. Lesslie v. State, 18 Ohio St. 390, 394 (1868). "[VMarious counts have been introduced
... for the purpose of meeting any difficulty which might arise on the trial from the misdirection of the offence in a single count...."
5. State v. Weed, 110 Ohio App. 186, 169 N.E.2d 39 (1954). See State v. Greeno, 89
Ohio App. 241, 101 N.E.2d 259 (1950), appeal dismissed, 155 Ohio St. 589, 99 N.E.2d
613 (1951).
6. 89 Ohio St. 383, 106 E.50 (1914).
7. Id. at 387, 106 N.E. at 51.
8. Id. at 386, 106 N.E. at 51.
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Certainly, a strict adherence to the "same evidence" test? would result
in a finding that section 2901.01 contains at least three offenses:
(1) murder with premeditation and malice, (2) murder while in the
act of committing rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, and (3) murder by
means of poison. An equally valid argument is that 2901.01 was designed to protect against one harm - the taking of a human life. Other
statutes found to contain several offenses are designed to protect against
several harms.1"
Restating the problem, whether section 2901.01 calls for one or more
offenses is directly related to the question of whether the legislature provided for a substitution or an addition of elements to the offense of firstdegree murder. That is, if malice is implied from the fact that defendant was in the act of committing a felony, then that act is being substituted for the element of malice which is required for this offense.
Of course, the legislature may label the various parts of a single transaction as separate offenses." A single act may be an offense under two
statutes, 12 a single statute and the common law," or several parts of the
same statute.14
a '5 the Ohio Supreme Court
In State v. Weed
said:
A statute often makes punishable the doing of one thing or another,
sometimes thus specifying a considerable number of things. Then,
by proper and ordinary construction, a person who in one transaction
does all, violates the statute but once, and incurs only one penalty. Yet
he violates it equally by doing one of the things.16
In the case of State v. Fillpot,'7 involving a similar statute in the State
of Washington, the court held that killing is one offense whether done
while committing robbery or with malice.'8 An Ohio court, however,
recently held that habeas corpus was improper to test a conviction for
9. See Duvall v. State, 111 Ohio St. 657, 146 NE. 90 (1924), State v. Corwin, 106 Ohio
St. 638, 140 NE. 369 (1922), Bainbridge v. State, 30 Ohio St. 264 (1876). See generally
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 285 (1961).
10. On statutory construction see generally Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958);
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955). Concerning the problem of "one transaction,"
see generally O'Neill v. United States, 236 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1956) (embezzlement); People
v. Stephens, 79 Cal. 428, 21 Pac. 856 (1889) (libel); Griffith v. State, 93 Ohio St. 294,
112 N.E. 1017 (1915).
11. State v. Benjamin, 102 Ohio App. 14, 132 N.B.2d 761, appeal dismissed, 165 Ohio St.
455, 135 N.E.2d 765, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 933 (1956).
12. City of Akron v. Kline, 165 Ohio St. 322, 135 N.E.2d 265 (1956).
13. See generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 285 (1961).
14. State v. Meadows, 105 Ohio App. 86, 148 NE.2d 345 (1957) (cutting with intent to
wound and intent to kill). See State v. Benjamin, 165 Ohio St. 455, 132 NE.2d 761 (1956),
appeal dismissed, 165 Ohio St. 455, 135 NE.2d 765, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 933 (1956).
15. 110 Ohio App. 186, 169 NXE.2d 39 (1954). See Herman, Criminal Law and Procedure, 1960 Survey of Ohio Law, 12 WEs. REs. L. REV. 502-04 (1961).
16. State v. Weed, 110 Ohio App. 186, 191, 169 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1954).
17. 51 Wash. 223, 98 Pac. 659 (1908).
18. State v. Hall, 185 Wash. 685, 56 P.2d 715 (1936).
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first-degree murder where the defendant was given two life sentences.19
A two-count indictment, one charging murder while in perpetration of a
felony and the other charging murder with premeditation and malice, resulted in a verdict of guilty on first-degree murder on one count and second-degree murder on the other. The court said: "Even conceding that
the sentence on one count would be void on the grounds alleged [double
jeopardy] ... he is still properly incarcerated on ... the other .... ""
When the same problem was properly brought before the same court in
the present case, it was no longer willing to concede the error and recognize jeopardy.
This case presents a somewhat different problem in that the court
did not recommend mercy on one count. If the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a felony is a substitution for premeditation and
malice,2 it is logical that a recommendation of mercy on one count
should apply to the other. This argument is advanced by Judge Gibson
in the dissent:
The only conceivable area of difference in the circumstances encompassed by the two counts for the single homicide is that of the defendant's intention.
It seems to me that under Section 2901.01, Revised Code, as at
common law, the enormity of the specific intent to kill evidenced by

premeditation and deliberation is far greater than the intent derived
from the fact that the actor was engaged in a specified felony at the

time of the killing. To recommend mercy where there must have
been a finding of deliberate and premeditated intention to kill and
yet no mercy where the guilty intent derived from the attempt to
perpetrate robbery is substituted for deliberate and premeditated malice,

in my opinion, is possible solely because of a22 failure to recognize that

only one felonious homicide was committed.

There is authority for the court to impose the highest sentence,' but
it is unjust to do so here. "To assume that the life sentence is 'mere
surplusage' may appear to ease the resolution of a difficult problem but
it places a low value on human life as well as logic." 24 Any dealing in
assumptions should be in defendant's favor. Although the prosecution
need not elect between various counts of an indictment, this freedom
ought not operate to deprive defendant of his Constitutional rights.2 5
NORMAN J. RUBINOFF
19. Lowther v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 39, 191 N.E.2d 172 (1963).
20. Id. at 40, 191 N.E.2d at 173.
21. CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES 248 (6th ed. 1952).
22. State v. Ferguson, 175 Ohio St. 390, 399, 195 N.E.2d 794, 800 (1964) (dissenting
opinion).
23. See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1960); State v. Weed, 110 Ohio App. 186,
169 N.E.2d 39 (1954).
24. State v. Ferguson, 175 Ohio St. 390, 399, 195 N.E.2d 794, 800 (1964) (dissenting

opinion).

25. OHIO CONST. art. 1, 5 10.
offense."

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same

